The creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh and the Buddhist-majority region of Leh was relieved that its long-standing demand had finally been met. Leh celebrated even when Kargil was revolting. However, there is widespread concern and unrest across Ladakh two years later, not only in Leh. This concern is about the rights of Ladakh’s inhabitants to work and land, the flood of foreigners, the degradation of local culture, environment, and history, and, most crucially, the absence of political participation.
The fact that not everything is fine in Leh was demonstrated in September 2020, when most Leh-based social and political organizations called for a boycott of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) until Ladakh is granted the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The two districts are awarded councils and Assam’s autonomous Bodoland Territorial Council.
The People’s Movement for the Sixth Schedule was created by all Leh-based parties, including the BJP, Congress, and AAP, to pursue this demand. Protests have escalated since then, but there have also been fundamental shifts like demands and means. The Leh Apex Body (LAB) of the People’s Movement has joined the Kargil Democratic Alliance in a single battle (KDA). This is exceptional, given Leh and Kargil’s history of solid hostility to each other’s aspirations, and the two have taken opposing views on the demand for UT.
These two bodies have launched a joint front with four significant demands: full-fledged statehood with constitutional safeguards; residentship certificates on the lines of state subjects to the people instead of domicile; two Lok Sabha seats and one Rajya Sabha seat for Ladakh; and immediate filling of vacancies in government jobs. In support of these objectives, the LAB and KDA issued a combined shutdown call in December 2021, which was met with tremendous support in Leh and Kargil.
An examination of Ladakh’s struggle in the post-reorganization period is fascinating reading. Two key differences may be seen when comparing the current fight for UT to the previous one. One, the exclusivity of the UT demand as representing Leh Buddhists solely (to the exclusion of Kargil Muslims) has given way to a more inclusive politics. A secular pan-Ladakhi identity has been established in place of a sectarian basis of Ladakhi identity and its split between Buddhists of Leh and Muslims of Kargil. Second, Ladakhi politics has taken a federal turn for the first time, even though the campaign for UT has been a protracted one.
It is worth noting that the demand for UT in Ladakh did not have a federal base but rather arose from the logic and desire for centralization. Seeking to address Ladakh’s neglect and disempowerment about the state power center, Ladakhi leaders (the Buddhists of Leh) have called for independence from J&K, particularly from Kashmir. Though proposed during the 1989 unrest led by the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA), the demand for UT was tied to the LBA’s decades-old goal of being removed from Kashmir and instead directly administered by the Centre.
In the context of a binary between Buddhists and Muslims, anxieties of conflict politics in which Kashmir was embroiled. On the other, Ladakhi Buddhist leaders directly represented Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947, giving three preferences. The Maharaja has now ruled Ladakh, merged with Hindu-majority areas Jammu, or permitted to join East Punjab. In another representation to Nehru, Ladakhi leaders advocated for the secession of Ladakh from Kashmir based on Ladakh’s separate identity and people.
When Ladakh momentarily fell under the direct authority of the Centre during the Chinese conflict, there was a clamor for the Centre to maintain control. The Ladakhi Buddhist leadership has maintained demands on the Ladakh central government and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA).
With separation from (Muslim) Kashmir as the core rationale of the demand for UT, the politics surrounding the need for UT suffered from its desire for centralization and its sectarian underpinning. Kargil’s politics developed a sectarian logic due to a chain reaction to this religious desire. Fearing that a separate UT for Ladakh would marginalize Kargil’s Muslims, Kargil sought support from Kashmir and solace in being a part of “Muslim-majority” Jammu and Kashmir.
Ladakhi leaders might gauge the restriction of the logic centralization with the foundation of the UT of Ladakh in 2019. While there was a sudden sense of vulnerability following the withdrawal of Article 35 A protections (particularly the privileges that Ladakhis enjoyed as permanent residents of J&K state in terms of land ownership and state employment), there was also a sense of powerlessness due to a lack of political representation. The UT of Ladakh, unlike the UT of J&K, does not have a legislature.
Ladakh was represented correctly in the state as part of J&K—aside from one MP, there were four MLAs, two MLCs, and, typically, a minister in the state administration. Ladakhis were also represented in many other state bodies as party members. Since its inception, the UT has only had one member of Parliament to participate in political decision-making. The new technology allows for both centralized and remote administration. Aside from the Lieutenant Governor, all Ladakh-related decisions are made directly at the level of India’s Home Minister. The hill councils still exist and have grown ineffectual due to increased bureaucratization and centralization.
In this perspective, one may comprehend Ladakh’s federal tendency in politics, motivated by more control over resources and a more decisive influence in development. Adopting a pan-Ladakhi identity, its politics has shed its sectarianism and been founded in a feeling of solidarity between Leh and Kargil, Ladakh’s two most significant sub-regions. The limited success of this approach is evident since it has prevented the Centre from enacting the types of central legislation that have already been extended to the UT of J&K. (including the new domicile law and new land policy).
Rather than developing Ladakh rules, the federal government has nearly acknowledged the Permanent Resident Certificate’s legitimacy by reserving non-government positions for Ladakh residents. The Ladakh Resident Certificate Order, 2021, explicitly defines Ladakh residents as individuals who have a Permanent Resident Certificate or are eligible for one. As things stand, Ladakh is the more effective of the two newly constituted UTs in resisting the processes of centralization.
Published by- Aashay Bhujbal
Edited by- Kritika Kashyap
