China, in its most direct admission yet that it has prioritized local issues above international ones, China’s Communist Party said on Wednesday that over the past five years it has “prioritized national interests” and exhibited a “fighting spirit”. As part of a reassessment of diplomacy under President Xi Jinping, observers say this confirmation of foreign policy during a crucial meeting is a clear indication that China will continue to be forceful. Xi is anticipated to extend his rule this month.
According to Wednesday’s report from the state news agency Xinhua, the party’s Central Committee made its announcement at its sixth plenum. The four-day plenum was its final assembly prior to the Congress’s upcoming, beginning on Sunday, leadership shuffle.
According to Xinhua, the party “placed internal politics ahead of national objectives, maintained strategic patience, showed combat spirit, and struggled to defend national honour and vital interests.”
The “appropriate management” of the risks and difficulties posed by the Ukraine crisis, the “ongoing fight against separatism and foreign intervention,” and the strict application of COVID limitations are among the party’s accomplishments, according to Xinhua.
China has emphasised its territorial claims to Taiwan, which is governed by itself, and criticised what it perceives as Western involvement in Hong Kong, a former British colony that came under Chinese sovereignty again in 1997.
A report that Xi would present at the Congress and a draught change to the party constitution were approved by a show of hands vote by the Central Committee, which was made up of approximately 360 senior party members. At the Congress, modifications will be announced.
Core National Interest of China
China’s national interest has been more publicly discussed and clearly defined in recent years. The highest-level description of the interests guiding Chinese strategic thought is provided by the debate of “core national interests,” a term that has gained popularity since around 2004.
The following three objectives are included in all definitions of these key interests put out by different Chinese leaders:
1. upholding the fundamental components of China’s state structure and national security (maintaining CCP rule);
2. defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity;
3. the society and economy of China are to develop steadily.
Survival of the Regime, Social Order, and Economic Development
Considering regime survival, domestic security, and economic progress as a means to those aims, the new discussion of core national interests is compatible with a larger body of Chinese strategic pronouncements and behaviour.
In crushing the Tiananmen protests in 1989, the leadership showed that it was willing to risk worldwide condemnation as well as significant economic harm, underscoring the importance of regime security.
This goal is now readily apparent in everything from media restriction to China’s diplomatic declarations and UN voting habits, which consistently defend sovereignty rules. Beijing places a strong focus on the steady growth of the national economy and society because it is essential for the survival of the regime.
Social instability may be the biggest challenge to the party, according to Beijing’s leaders, who also see balanced economic development as important.
Since Deng Xiaoping initiated reform and opened China to economic connections with the rest of the world after 1978, economic growth has been a primary objective. Beijing’s foreign policy under Deng switched from supporting national liberation groups and ideological conflict to promoting trade with almost all governments, regardless of regime type.
Regional peace and stability have been emphasised repeatedly as a requirement for economic progress in foreign policy statements. Beijing has attempted to reassure neighbouring states by describing these advancements as “China’s peaceful rise” and “peace and development” as its influence has expanded and its neighbours have grown increasingly cautious of it.
Notably, despite engaging in targeted trade retaliation in economic disputes, China has not enacted penalties meant to further its strictly political objectives.
Beijing may be more willing than ever to bear some economic costs to advance international political goals, but in a number of significant recent instances where political conflicts appeared likely to have an impact on Chinese trade or investment interests, Beijing has exercised restraint to keep those costs to a minimum.
Territorial Integrity
Additionally, not new to Beijing’s strategic vocabulary is the preservation of “national sovereignty” and “territorial integrity”.On the other hand, the idea of sovereignty as a codified and universal “core national interest” may have significant ramifications for Chinese action.
As of now, official debates of China’s fundamental national interests restrict the granting of “territorial integrity” to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, three sizable regions that have long been contentious and sensitive. As long as the Chinese state is secure and its economy is strong, Tibet and Xinjiang, which Beijing controls, are unlikely to cause an interstate conflict or pose a significant international threat.
The only part of China not under Beijing’s control, Taiwan, has long been considered the most hazardous international flashpoint involving China. Most territorial disputes involving China have been resolved through territory loss rather than gain, including nearly all of its land boundary disputes.
However, depending on how it is used, the language of essential interests could make it more difficult to resolve the unresolved disagreements, notably by restricting Beijing’s ability to make concessions.
Beijing may find it difficult to deny unofficial claims made by military officials or others who may refer to disputed region as such, even if Beijing does not formally declare that the South China Sea is a vital national interest. The Spratly Islands’ inclusion in this group has already caused a great deal of debate in the West.
The risk that new regions, like Taiwan, could turn into intractable problems from both the Chinese domestic political and international perspectives has increased as a result of Beijing’s leaders’ popularisation of a generalised language of core national interests that might be applied to the South China Sea.
Global Role
China wants to be viewed as a significant and helpful part of the international community, but there is disagreement over what exactly that entails. It values its membership in the UN, UN Security Council, World Trade Organization, G-20, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, and a number of other international organisations because it has a significant stake in a significant portion of the current global governance architecture.
Additionally, it participates in a variety of regional organizations in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South America, Africa, and other regions as a member or observer. It has increased its organizational and financial contributions, which now cover personnel and international training duties, at both the global and regional levels.
Beijing’s perception of its function as an active member of the international community differs from Washington’s perspective on many occasions: The degree of convergence with American perspectives depends heavily on the subject at hand and is a result of particular Chinese objectives.
The six-party negotiations on North Korea have seen strong participation from China, and it has also taken part in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden by conducting joint patrols with South Korean and Japanese contingents. Its positions are more similar to those of the United States than, for example, those of India on some economic, trade, and investment issues.
On a few others, like genetically modified crops, it is more similar to Washington than most European states.
In other instances, Chinese positions conflict with American ones. The most significant of these concerns is national sovereignty. Beijing is extremely hesitant to support sanctions or other actions that could further erode international standards associated with national sovereignty out of concern for international interference in China’s own affairs in the case of internal instability.
In order to counter or hinder American and European efforts to penalise Syria and Iran, China has joined forces with Russia (and, in some situations, Brazil, India, and others). While being a member of the majority of the organizations that define the current global system, China also plays an active and significant role in at least two of these organizations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the alliance made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa has attempted to influence world politics in ways that are more favorable to emerging or non-Western nations.
Last but not least, Washington’s position, which maintains that there are no restrictions on freedom of navigation, conflicts with Beijing’s interpretation of the UN Law of the Sea, which gives Beijing the right to deny other countries access to its exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for things like military surveillance and marine scientific research. Beijing disagrees with the majority of the world’s opinion in this, despite the fact that 16 other states have taken positions similar to China’s (including India and the Philippines).
More power will be given to Xi Jinping in 20th National Congress by Chinese Community Party
China is moving further inward into authoritarianism and rapidly losing its carefully constructed competitive edge, despite the fact that Xi Jinping has solidified his control and suppressed domestic criticism. Xi’s third term is highly anticipated. With the escalating crisis, China is being perceived as “strategic threat” by the neighbouring states. The quest of China for legitimacy and sovereignty is still not over.
