Wandering through Pohyola’s chambers/Through the halls of Sariola/How the hero went unbidden/To the feasting and carousal/Uninvited to the dinner,” says Kaukomieli. Thus begins Rune 27 of the Kalevala, Finland’s national epic, most known outside of Finland because of Jean Sibelius’ Kullervo symphonic poem.
Finland has denied invitations to several banquets throughout its brief independence. Still, the doors of NATO, the Western world’s most excellent feast, are now wide open to Finland and its neighbour Sweden. And, as Finland’s president and prime minister stated in separate New Year’s addresses, Finland plans to make a decision on whether to join the alliance without contacting Russia beforehand.
That’s a significant change from Finland’s Cold War years when negotiations with the Soviet Union preceded each major decision. It might be a turning moment in the relationship between the two Nordic nations and NATO.
A journalist from Finland spoke at a conference in Dublin in 1995Â “NATO is no longer a four-letter term in Finnish political discourse,”
According to the daily Helsingin Sanomat. Things were already shifting. Finland and its neighbour Sweden were notably nonaligned throughout the Cold War, insisting on protecting their defences, which they achieved at great expense and with outstanding efforts encompassing all sectors of society. However, NATO as a four-letter acronym? Mentions of the alliance were as poisonous as profane language in polite company in Cold War Sweden and Finland.
Indeed, Sweden quietly helped with NATO while maintaining its public neutrality. Sweden’s social democratic government began providing intelligence to the United States and other NATO nations in the late 1940s, purchasing defensive weapons from them, and relying on the US to come to Sweden’s rescue in the event of a Soviet invasion.
Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme the former minister, who openly despised the US and even marched in anti-Vietnam War protests, continued to work with the US until his assassination in 1986. “However, the Swedish people were the last to learn about it,” Rodney Kennedy-Minott, the United States ambassador to Sweden from 1977 to 1980, said Radio Sweden in 1994.
Swedes were so dedicated to their nation’s single-handed defence that they voluntarily, even cheerfully, participated in what was known as a complete defence. From running contingency plans (including underground facilities) for critical companies to supporting driving vehicles to support the armed forces, military radio communications, and even training military canines, around 3 million Swedes participated in the armed forces out of a total population of 7 to 8.5 million individuals at the time.
As a result, when Pal Jonson, then 22 years old, was called up for military duty in 1994, even though he was attending college in the United States, he didn’t try to avoid it (on a table tennis scholarship). On the contrary, the aspiring international relations expert embraced his new job as a coastal ranger with zeal. And Pal Jonson is already persuaded that his country should become a member of NATO.
He informed me, “NATO offers countries a seat at the security table.” “It helps allies standardise their military forces and ensures trans-Atlantic connectivity.”
“If you had asked me back then if Albania would join NATO before Sweden, I would have laughed,” Jonson, who went on to obtain a PhD in war studies and now leads the Swedish parliament’s military committee, said. Sweden, on the other hand, did not. “Our nonalignment has less to do with security strategy and more to do with national identity.”
The United States and Finland’s Cold War, on the other hand, couldn’t have imagined Swedish-style collaboration with the US even if it had wanted to: the Soviet Union maintained a careful eye on its neighbour, whom it had compelled to sign a so-called friendship treaty after World War II. The Finns were not even allowed to keep the auxiliary defence groups that allowed Sweden to retain their spectacular comprehensive defence under the treaty’s terms.
In truth, former Finnish President Urho Kekkonen was a cunning operator who prioritized collaboration with Moscow over coordination with his parliament—but his actions also allowed Finland to integrate into Western Europe without provoking Moscow’s wrath. Despite Kekkonen and the friendship pact, the Finns used whatever resources to keep the country safe from the Soviets. After World War II, they implemented a national mental defence concept to teach the public how to protect the country.
Finns were more eager to protect their nation with guns than anyone in any other European country, according to a 2015 Gallup poll: 74 % of Finns indicated they’d be willing to defend their country with arms. The Swedes received 55 % of the vote, while Germany received 18 %. Citizens of a well-governed nation that isn’t a member of a defence alliance, on the other hand, are more likely to feel devoted to their country’s defence than those who are accustomed to depending on the US military.
However, given the stakes involved in defending a 5.6 million-strong country against a 146-million-strong immediate neighbour, having three-quarters of the population eager to chip in demonstrates extraordinary civic devotion. In addition, the Finns followed Sweden’s lead in the 1960s and established a national defence school for emerging leaders from all walks of life.
Those fortunate enough to be admitted into the residential course—which includes legislators and corporate executives—study the fundamentals of Finnish national security and form unique relationships that help national cohesiveness to this day.
And, of course, the Finns had their distinct musical style. During Kekkonen’s warmest years with Moscow, Finnish orchestras and choirs continued to perform Finnish music, almost as a communal infusion of national resolve. They continued to sing “Finlandia,” Sibelius’ most renowned piece, whose choral hymn concludes with the lyrics “Finland, arise, because to the world thou criest/that thou hast flung off thy slavery/beneath oppression’s yoke thou never liest/Thy morning’s come, O Finland of ours!”
In his New Year’s address to the country, Finnish President Sauli Niinisto stated in his New Year’s address.
“Finland’s capacity to manoeuvre and freedom of choice also include the potential of military alignment and application for NATO membership, should we ourselves decide,”
It meant much more when Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin stated in her New Year’s greeting that “we maintain the possibility of asking for NATO membership.” We must defend this freedom of choice and ensure that it stays a reality since it is part of each country’s right to determine its security policy.” The accusations came days after Maria Zakharova, a spokeswoman for Russia’s foreign ministry, warned of “severe political and military consequences” if Finland and Sweden joined the alliance.
Russia strives to disguise the natural grief of a country it has lost by channelling world conversation toward NATO enlargement.” René Nyberg, a former Finnish ambassador to Moscow and co-author of a 2016 government-commissioned research on Finnish NATO membership, said, “The Russians are forcing us to debate about NATO.” “However, the actual problem is Ukraine, not Finnish or Swedish NATO membership.”
“Sweden and Finland have a very tight military relationship and even cooperative defence planning,” Jonson said. Indeed, because the two nations would only join the alliance jointly, public opinion in both countries is critical. Finland and, in particular, Sweden has agonised over NATO membership for many years since the end of the Cold War, and the two Finnish presidents’ statements are sure to affect Sweden as well.
According to Finland’s defence ministry’s annual study of Finns’ opinions toward national security, 24 % favour NATO membership, while 20 % supported it in 2020. Indeed, in recent years, polls have consistently hovered around 20%. Meanwhile, a survey conducted in early 2021 in Sweden found that 46 % of Swedes desire to join NATO, up from 43 % three years previously.
Finland and Sweden may decide not to apply for NATO membership in the end. But, as Niinisto and Marin point out, it is Finland’s option, just as it is Sweden’s. What a relief for two countries, notably Finland, who have spent decades worried about how Moscow will respond to their every military choice.
While Kekkonen felt compelled to communicate with the Kremlin on subjects other than military matters, Finland has entered the period of Kaukomieli, who acts without being asked.
