In the middle of the atmosphere of war, it can be difficult to see the way ahead. The news from the warzone, the delicate noises off, the feelings of mourning and dislocation; of all these can be frustrating. So let us step back and have a look at how the war may outcome. What are some of the possible frameworks that politicians and military planners are examining? Few can envision the future with confidence, but here are some possible outcomes. Most of them are unprotected.
Short war
Under this case, Russia shoots up its military operations. There are more aimless batteries and rocket strikes across Ukraine. The Russian air force – which has played a low-key role so far – shoots destructive airstrikes. Huge cyber-attacks scrape across Ukraine, targeting lead national infrastructure. Energy supplies and communications networks are closets. Thousands of civilians die. In spite of fearless resistance, Kyiv falls within days. The government is restored with a pro-Moscow hostage regime. President Zelensky is either eliminated or runs away, to western Ukraine or even overseas, to set up a government in exile. President Putin announces win and pulls out some forces, leaving sufficient behind to nurture some control. Thousands of refugees continue to run away from the west. Ukraine joins Belarus as a client state of Moscow.
This consequence is possible by all means but would depend on numerous factors changing: Russian forces improvising their performance, more of those forces being deteriorated, and Ukraine’s extraordinary fighting spirit vanishing. Mr. Putin might achieve authorities change in Kyiv and Ukraine’s western integration comes to an end. But any pro-Russian government would be illegal and vulnerable to rebellion. Such an outcome would not remain stable and the prospect of conflict blowing up again would be high.
Long war
Maybe more likely is that this evolves into a prolonged war. Perhaps Russian forces get hindered, obstructed by low spirits, poor management and inexpert leadership. Maybe it takes longer for Russian forces to protect cities like Kyiv whose protectors fight from street to street. A long investment ensues. The fighting has echoes of Russia’s long and brutal struggle in the 1990s to snatch and largely destroy Grozny, the capital of Chechnya.
And even once Russian forces have conquered some existence in the cities of Ukraine, perhaps they struggle to maintain the dominance. Maybe Russia cannot provide enough troops to cover such a huge country. Ukraine’s defensive forces convert into a successful insurgency, motivated and supported enough by the localists. The West continues to provide weapons and missiles. And then, perhaps after many years, with maybe new leadership in Moscow, Russian forces eventually leave Ukraine, bowed and bloodied, just like their precursors left Afghanistan in 1989 after a decade fighting Islamist agitators.
European war
Might it be possible this war could overturn outside Ukraine’s borders? President Putin could seek to invade more parts of Russia’s former empire by sending troops into ex-Soviet republics like Moldova and Georgia, which are not a part of NATO. Or there could just be mistakes and magnification. Mr. Putin could proclaim Western arms stockpiles to Ukrainian forces are an act of aggression that validates retaliation. He could threaten to send troops into the Baltic states – which are the members of NATO – such as Lithuania, to establish a land corridor with the Russian coastal colony of Kaliningrad.
This would be highly dangerous and risk war with NATO. Under Article 5 of the military alliance’s charter, an attack on one member is an attack on all. But Mr. Putin might take the risk if he felt it was the only way of protecting his leadership. If he was, maybe, facing defeat in Ukraine, he might persuade to shoot up further. We now know the Russian leader is willing to break long-standing international rules. The use of nuclear weapons can emerge due to this reason. This week, Mr. Putin put his nuclear forces on a higher level of alert. Most analysts doubt this means their use is probably approaching. But it was a reminder that Russian doctrine allows for the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
Diplomatic solution
Might there still be a possible diplomatic solution, in spite of everything?
The UN Secretary-General António Guterres said, “The guns are talking now, but the path of dialogue must always remain open.” The dialogue resumes. President Macron of France has talked to President Putin on the phone. Diplomats say feelers are being stretched out to Moscow. And, to the surprise, Russian and Ukrainian officials have met for talks on the border with Belarus. They might not have built much progress. But, by agreeing to the talks, Putin seems to at least have accepted the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire.
The important question is whether the West can provide what diplomats refer to as an “off-ramp”. “Offramp” is an American term for a way out of a major highway. Diplomats say it is important that the Russian leader knows what it would take for Western disciplines to lift so a face-saving deal is at least possible.
Consider this scenario. The war goes badly for Russia. Disciplines begin to unresolve Moscow. Opposition grows like the body bags returning home. Mr. Putin ponders if he has bitten off more than he could chew. He judges that going on with the war may be a greater threat to his leadership than the embarrassment of ending it. China steps in, putting pressure on Moscow to settlement, warning that it will not buy oil and gas from Russia unless it de-escalates. So, Mr. Putin starts to look for a solution. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities see the destruction of their country going on and conclude that political compromise might be better than such devastating loss of life. So, diplomats engage and a deal is done. Say, if Ukraine accepts Russian sovereignty over Crimea and parts of the Donbas. In turn, Putin accepts Ukrainian independence and its right to deepen ties with Europe. This may not seem obvious. But it is not beyond the realms of credibility that such a scenario could emerge from the pieces of a bloody war.
Putin ousted
And what of Vladimir Putin himself? When he started the invasion, he declared: “We are ready for any outcome.”
But what if that outcome was him losing power? It might seem impossible. But the world has changed in recent days and such things are now to think about. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at Kings College, London, wrote this week: “It is now as likely that there will be regime change in Moscow as in Kyiv.”
Why might he say this? Well, maybe Mr. Putin pursues a devastating war. Thousands of Russian soldiers die. The economic authorization bites. Mr. Putin loses his popular support. Perhaps there is the threat of popular revolution. He uses Russia’s internal security forces to defeat that opposition. But this turns out sour and enough members of Russia’s military, political and economic class turn against him. The West makes clear that if Putin goes and is replaced by a more moderate leader, then Russia will see the lifting of some authorization and repairing of normal diplomatic relations. There is a bloody palace takeover and Putin is out. Again, this may not seem possible right now. But it may not be doubtful if the people who have benefited from Mr. Putin no longer believe he can defend their interests.
Conclusion
These scenarios are not consistent – some of each could combine and produce different results. However, this war plays out, the world has changed. It will not return to the status of the affairs that existed previously. Russia’s relationship with the other nations will be different. European attitudes to security will be changed. And the liberal, international rules-based order might just have restored what it was for in the first place.
Published By: Pawan Rajput
Edited By: Kiran Maharana
